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Abstract 
Impact investments are emerging as a new asset class of social finance. These 
investments intend to create positive societal impact beyond a financial return through the 
development of social enterprises. Scholars have highlighted the conflicting institutional 
logics that these later hybrid organizations must face when combining social welfare and 
profitability. Yet we lack in-depth, systemic insight into how impact investing funds are 
responding to similar pressures and specifically to the pressure to conform to societal 
performance management. This paper builds on a three year action-research program 
conducted with Schneider Electric, a multinational enterprise specialized in energy 
management. The company initiated and sponsored an impact investing fund targeting 
energy access ventures in Sub-Saharan Africa, alongside four Development Finance 
Institutions. The article is grounded in neo-institutional and resource dependence theories to 
analyze the perceptions of the fund’s managers’ regarding emerging societal performance 
management procedures they were urged to adopt. The findings suggest a pattern of 
responses from the fund’s managers starting with passive conformity to external pressures 
and eventually turning to more resistive compromise with their own investors through inter-
organizational arrangements. The paper further asserts the establishment of impact investing 
as an institution in the making with potentially conflicting but not incompatible logics.  
Keywords: Impact Investing, base of the pyramid, institutional theory, resource 
dependence theory, action-research, case study 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, a new asset class of social finance has emerged. A recent study on 
125 impact investing funds revealed a cumulative commitment of USD 46 billion of direct 
investments mostly in companies (78%) active in emerging markets (70%) (Saltuk, El Idrissi, 
Bouri, Mudaliar, & Schiff, 2014). Investments in social enterprises active in microfinance and 
financial services, energy, housing, food and agriculture, healthcare or education aim at 
tackling societal needs of low-income populations also referred to as the Base of the Pyramid 
(BoP). Impact investments are promised to exponentially grow over the next decade, 
reaching at least USD 400 billion available for impact-oriented ventures (O’Donohoe, 
Leijonhufvud, Saltuk, Bugg-Levine, & Brandenburg, 2010). This constitutes a promising 
opportunity for both social enterprises that are currently undercapitalized and policy makers 
aiming to boost their social and environmental sustainability commitments through economic 
development (Mendell & Barbosa, 2013). 
As a nascent industry, impact investing has not yet attracted much scholar study. A first 
common definition describes their investments as intended to create positive social and/or 
environmental impact beyond financial return (Höchstädter & Scheck, 2014). Similar to social 
enterprises or microfinance organizations in which they invest, impact investing funds can be 
described as “hybrid” organizations (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Smith, Gonin, & Besharov, 
2013). In that sense, they need to combine two potentially conflicting logics, namely a social 
welfare and a commercial logic (Jay, 2013). To remain legitimate, impact investing funds are 
urged by their stakeholders at large to manage and report societal performance alongside 
traditional financial one. While no standards exist per se, impact investing funds evolve in an 
institutional change – or an institution in the making – in which values, beliefs, practices and 
rules are still structuring (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002). Examining the practical 
engagement of the impact investing industry has not been systematically carried out. 
Therefore, the paper aims at understanding how an impact investing fund is responding to 
this double pressure and more specifically to the pressure to conform to societal 
performance management.  
The paper is built on the in-depth case study (Eisenhardt  & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009) of 
Energy Access Ventures Fund (EAVF), an impact investing fund aggregating total assets of 
€ 54.5 million and targeting energy access ventures in Sub-Saharan Africa. The case is 
grounded in an action-research partnership (Rapoport, 1970) initiated in late 2011 with 
Schneider Electric. The company is a global leader in energy management that actually 
launched and sponsored the project in the context of its access to energy program targeting 
the Base of the Pyramid. This case study analyzes the design of the fund and the 
negotiations that took place between the fund’s managers and its investors, namely its 
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corporate sponsor and four Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), until the date of its 
closing in early 2015. While the fund’s managers attracted the DFIs based on common 
beliefs and aspirations in impact investing, the later enforced them to consider numerous 
requirements prior their investment in EAVF. Constraints such as a minimum internal rate of 
return, a limited share of organizational and management fees or a high level of expectation 
to monitor societal benefits of each investment appeared potentially conflicting to the fund’s 
managers. The purpose of this article is therefore to examine the managerial perceptions of 
an emerging societal management system that the fund’s managers were urged to adopt. In 
order to study the fund’s strategic responses to these pressures we ground the case in neo-
institutional and resource dependence theories, as initiated by (Oliver, 1991). Institutional 
theory has been well mobilized to study hybrid organizations such as social enterprises 
(Pache & Santos, 2010, 2013), microfinance organizations (Battilana & Dorado, 2010), and 
Social Responsible Investments (Arjalies, 2013). Early writings in institutional theory mostly 
predicted isomorphism and conformity to dominant norms (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). However, 
recent writings emphasize that factors such as agency, choice, proactiveness and self-
interest can lead to a variety of more resistive responses (Jamali, 2010; Oliver, 1991; Tan & 
Wang, 2011).  
In our case study, EAVF did not enact isomorphism per se as no explicit societal 
performance management standards were either shared within the impact investing industry 
or agreed between the fund’s investors, namely the Development Finance Institutions. The 
findings rather suggest that acquiescence to comply with such practices appeared first to 
EAVF as a natural strategic response to conform to their own beliefs and values, and their 
investors’ expectations. In a second phase, EAVF searched for compromise when they faced 
the operational complexity of the procedure that could hinder both the business development 
activities of the portfolio companies and the overall monitoring of EAVF’s investments. The 
requirements of the DFIs to enrich the newly created Societal Management Procedure led to 
inter-organizational arrangements and negotiations. EAVF managers acknowledged their 
resource dependence towards the DFIs that somehow limited their bargaining power while 
they recognize that such procedure could grant them legitimacy towards external rating and 
certifying bodies. Beyond solely compliance or isomorphism to societal management 
pressures, the research findings reveal a potential risk for EAVF managers to avoid the DFIs 
requirements once they will pragmatically face the operational constraints of investing in 
social enterprises. The risk in such decoupling would be to impregnate the fund with a “social 
identity” in response to institutional pressures from its investors and its stakeholders at large 
and thus to lose legitimacy. The findings suggest that the inter-organizational arrangements 
through periodic discussions and renegotiations of the DFIs’ requirements would continue 
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during the fund’s life-time, limiting the risk to create a “legitimacy façade”. Finally, the 
research findings reassert a potential conflict – or a delicate balance – between profit and 
societal value creation objectives for the investment managers. The fund’s managers 
recognize that they embed two logics that are potentially conflicting although not 
incompatible. Compatibility would be managed through the negotiated Societal Management 
Procedure that consists in novel form of practices integrated within the overall investment 
procedure of the fund. As such, the paper further asserts the establishment of impact 
investing as an institution in the making provided that its practices are sufficiently diffused in 
the interconnected community of its practitioners. 
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
impact investing and societal performance management and then presents relevant 
institutional and resource dependence theories that were used to guide the empirical part of 
the paper based on the framework of Oliver (1991). Section 3 explains the research context 
as well as the grounding of the paper in Action Research and the case study methodology. 
Section 4 derives the theoretical framework on the strategic responses from an impact 
investing fund to institutional pressures. Section 5 discusses the findings. Finally, Section 6 
concludes this paper and suggests future research.  
2. LITTERATURE OVERVIEW 
2.1. Social innovation, impact investing and societal performance 
Social innovation and social finance 
The “social innovation” concept has recently regained corporate interest. Westley and 
Antadze (2010, p. 2) defined social innovation as being “a complex process of introducing 
new products, processes or programs that profoundly change the basic routines, resource 
and authority flows, or beliefs of the social system in which innovation occurs. Such 
successful social innovations have durability and broad impact”. Social innovation 
encompasses terms such as “social enterprise,” “social entrepreneurship,” and “social 
finance”. We are witnessing the emergence of organizations that adopt commercial ventures 
to achieve societal objectives such as poverty alleviation, health and education provision or 
climate change resilience. Relatively new actors such as social enterprises (Dacin, Dacin, & 
Tracey, 2011; Mair & Marti, 2006; Seelos & Mair, 2005) and microfinance organizations 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Bédécarrats, 2013) have taken the lion’s share among academia. 
In the meantime, multinational enterprises pursuing their corporate responsibility have 
embraced the possibility to find growth or strategic opportunities while contributing to poverty 
alleviation (André, 2014) through “Base of the Pyramid” (BoP) strategies (Prahalad & 
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Fruehauf, 2004) or social business ventures (Yunus, 2008). Despite the diversity of these 
ventures, adopting practices from both for-profit and not-for-profit sectors, they all require 
financial resources to start-up, grow, and go to scale. However, small and medium-sized 
entrepreneurs in developing countries’ economies have little access to finance and fall in the 
“Missing Middle” (Kauffmann, 2005). They find their main sources of capital in their retained 
earnings and informal savings which are often not secured and have little scope for risk-
sharing. Their access to formal finance is poor as they rarely meet conditions set by formal 
financial institutions and are also, generally, too large for microfinance organizations. 
A new class of social finance actors has emerged to answer the specific needs of 
ventures pursuing social innovation (Moore, Westley, & Nicholls, 2012). Social enterprises 
are no longer solely tied to grants and contracts from government agencies or foundations as 
primary sources of financial support. In between the traditional philanthropy and mainstream 
investing, “social investments” are pursuing a blended value creation “that combines both an 
attention to financial return and a focus on social/environmental outputs or outcomes” 
(Nicholls, 2010, p. 76). Among the different terminologies covered by social investments, 
impact investing emerges as a “powerful and promising opportunity for social enterprises that 
are currently undercapitalized, as well as a boost to economic development committed to 
social and environmental sustainability around the world” (Mendell & Barbosa, 2013, p. 2).  
Impact investing 
Impact investing is a nascent industry which has not yet attracted much scholar study. A 
first academic review performed by Höchstädter and Scheck (2014) highlights the absence of 
a uniform definition and a clear understanding. Nevertheless, a high level of agreement 
anchors impact investing around “two core elements: non-financial impact, typically in the 
form of social and/or environmental impact, and financial return, which requires at least the 
preservation of the invested principal but can allow for market-beating returns” (Höchstädter 
& Scheck, 2014, p. 12). It is noteworthy that non-financial impact – i.e. societal impact – is 
meant to be intentional, that is to say, not an incidental side-effect of an investment. On the 
debate about the balance between financial and non-financial returns, the strategy of an 
impact investor is considered to be at his or her own discretion, while a segmentation could 
classify him or her in finance-first or impact-first investors (Freireich & Fulton, 2009, p. 31; 
Joy, de Las Casas, & Rickey, 2011, p. 11). 
Impact investors are quite diverse and can range from Development Finance Institutions 
(DFIs), privately managed funds, foundations, or diversified financial organizations and 
banks (Saltuk et al., 2014). Asset classes and financial instruments mobilized by investors 
appear to be quite large, with a predominance of debt, equity, guarantees, and deposits 
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(Höchstädter & Scheck, 2014). Impact investments will focus on ventures, mostly in 
emerging or developing countries, active in a wide range of sectors including agriculture, 
clean technology and energy, education, healthcare, financial services and microfinance, 
housing, or water. These investees appear to be predominantly in a post-venture stage (i.e. 
growth or mature stage), therefore testifying to a proven track record that shall limit the risks 
for the investors (Saltuk et al., 2014). In that sense, impact investing differs from or “goes 
beyond” Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) by the fact that the former primarily targets 
small investees that are not publicly listed and would include a greater proactiveness to solve 
social or environmental stakes (Höchstädter & Scheck, 2014). The centrality of the societal 
impact purpose of such investments requires the investors to track and measure this specific 
value creation at the investee level. However, an often cited and important limitation of the 
industry resides in the fact that there is a “lack of internationally agreed accounting standards 
for such capital flows” (Nicholls, 2010, p. 93). 
Measuring impact performance 
The concept of impact monitoring and evaluation primarily emanates from development 
aid in humanitarian and public sectors. It has been well studied and practiced especially by 
development cooperation agencies and philanthropists considering their responsibility or 
objectives to contribute to public interest and social welfare. The term impact is defined as 
the “Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a 
development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended” (OECD, 2002, p. 24). 
Central to this concept of impact evaluation is the notion of counterfactual: the scenario or 
situation in the absence of a development intervention. Specifying counterfactual permits us 
to identify the actual contribution of an intervention in the long term. More recently, social 
impact evaluations have also regained interest in the promotion of experimental techniques 
such as randomized control trials (RCTs) (Duflo & Kremer, 2003). However, such impact 
evaluations and methodologies require high costs, human resources, and time that may not 
be supported by social enterprises (Hulme, 2000). 
Social impact measurement has gained interest among social innovation practitioners, 
whether they are oriented for-profit or not-for-profit. More specifically, social enterprises are 
frequently mobilized on this topic in order to update their boards of directors in the 
achievement of their social mission, appease their investors willing to control the use of the 
funds, or guide their management team concerned with improving its activities (Stievenart & 
Pache, 2014). Despite the proliferation of hundreds of competing methods for calculating 
social value, social enterprises struggle to put them into practice (Mulgan, 2010). Besides the 
ex-post impact evaluations aimed at assessing the long-term effects of the activities of a 
social enterprise, one can characterize two other types of impact measurement approaches 
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(Olsen & Galimidi, 2008; Tuan, 2008): ex-ante decision-making approaches such as cost-
benefit and cost-effective analyses aimed at rating funding allocations and on-going 
performance monitoring approaches aimed at understanding the induced social changes. On 
the latest, Mair and Marti (2006, p. 42) urge to make major efforts to “quantify” the 
performance and “to develop useful and meaningful measures that capture the impact of 
social entrepreneurship and reflect the objectives pursued.” 
While impact investors go beyond financial value creation, they must also develop new 
impact measurements. This would improve the transparency of the reporting of social 
investees’ performance, enhance their accountability towards stakeholders, and provide 
better data for capital allocation decisions within the social finance market (Antadze & 
Westley, 2012). Impact investors are adopting different impact measurement approaches 
such as rating systems (e.g. Global Impact Investing Rating Systems, GIIRS), certification or 
assessment systems (e.g. BCorp) or performance management systems (e.g. Impact 
Reporting & Investment Standard, IRIS) (Mendell & Barbosa, 2013; Olsen & Galimidi, 2008). 
The agreement on standardized performance impact metrics has been reported by 
practitioners as an important factor to develop the impact investing industry (Saltuk et al., 
2014). As such, the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN), a not-for-profit organization 
dedicated to increasing the scale and effectiveness of the impact investing industry, 
promoted the use of the IRIS. IRIS is defined as a “catalog of generally-accepted 
performance metrics” (GIIN, 2015). IRIS rather describes societal outputs or outcomes in 
different sectors of activities than long-term impact evaluations per se. In that sense, 
Geobey, Westley, and Weber (2012) argue that building such meaningful and 
multidimensional measures represents an incremental innovation for investors while still 
having the potential to create transformative outcomes. The survey of Saltuk et al. (2014) on 
125 impact investing funds reports for a large adoption of IRIS, promising that the tool will 
become a standard according to its proponents (Bouri, 2011). 
2.2. Institutional and resource dependence perspectives on pressures 
Neo-institutional theory 
Institutional theory argues that relationships among organizations and the fields in which 
they operate are influenced by their institutional environment. An institution can be defined as 
“relatively widely diffused practices, technologies, or rules that have become entrenched in 
the sense that it is costly to choose other practices, technologies, or rules” (Lawrence, Hardy, 
& Nelson, 2002, p. 282). Earlier neo-institutional theorists emphasize the coercive, mimetic, 
and normative pressures of an institution that shapes somewhat predictable business 
practices. These pressures lead to isomorphism between organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 
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1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Such isomorphism, which corresponds to integrating taken-
for-granted values, beliefs, norms, and practices, will in turn protect the organization from 
having its conduct questioned. This would help organizations gain legitimacy, that is the 
recognition of a socially desirable, proper, or appropriate status (Suchman, 1995). Meyer and 
Rowan (1977, p. 349) argue further that “institutional isomorphism promotes the success and 
survival of organizations”. This approach is well suited, however, for a fully institutionalized 
field that has a clear institutional logic.  
Institutions are dynamic and subject to change. Multiple institutional logics – that are the 
organizing principles that shape the behavior of field participants – might influence 
organizations simultaneously (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). These multiple logics can co-exist 
and sometimes compete, leading to complexity (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & 
Lounsbury, 2011). An example of competing institutional logics is provided by Tan and Wang 
(2011) for multinational enterprises facing different ethical pressures from the parent and 
host countries where they operate. Similarly, Westermann-Behaylo, Berman, and Van Buren 
(2014) study the multiple logics in corporate responsibility that affect the relationship between 
the firm and its employees. These both studies describe arrangements performed by the 
firms to ensure their operations. Under such institutional change, co-existing logics might 
therefore give birth to a new hybrid version of the previous dominant logics (Arjalies, 2013; 
Thornton, Jones, & Kury, 2005). 
Hybrid institutions and organizations 
A “hybrid” organization is an organization that embodies multiple institutional logics. 
Recently, researchers mobilized an institutional perspective to examine social innovation 
(Dacin et al., 2011). Several scholars describe social enterprises as hybrid organizations in 
the sense that they combine social welfare and commercial logics (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Pache & Santos, 2010, 2013; Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011). Battilana and Dorado (2010) 
describe specifically microfinance organizations as hybrid entities that “combined two 
previously separated ‘logics’: a development logic that guided their mission to help the poor, 
and a banking logic that required profits sufficient to support ongoing operations and fulfill 
fiduciary obligations.” Similarly, we argue that impact investing funds are hybrid organizations 
that combine a development logic and an investment logic. Impact investing funds will 
predominantly invest equity or debt in social enterprises or ventures, who themselves are 
facing multiple logics in order to tackle social issues such as poverty. The organizational field 
of social innovation thus extends to integrating these relatively new impact investing funds 
that support the development of social enterprises or micro-finance organizations. As a 
nascent type of organization, impact investing has not been significantly addressed in the 
literature. 
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Most of the cited authors referring to social enterprises as hybrid organizations describe 
the simultaneous combination of conflicting logics. A new institutional logic that is a hybrid 
version of the previous multiple logics can produce an institutional change (Jay, 2013; 
Thornton et al., 2005). In that sense, Reay and Hinings (2009) argue that competing logics 
can co-exist and that developing collaborative relationships helps to manage the rivalry 
between these logics. Collaboration has also been identified by Lawrence et al. (2002) to 
help create “proto-institutions”. The authors define proto-institutions as “practices, 
technologies, and rules that are narrowly diffused and only weakly entrenched, but have the 
potential to become widely institutionalized” (Lawrence et al., 2002, p. 283), or in other words 
as institutions in the making.  
Coming back to our organizational field, Nicholls (2010) describes the institutionalization 
process of the social investment sector and thus impact investments. Mobilizing neo-
institutional theory, Nicholls (2010)  highlights the multiple, contradictory, or ambiguous 
institutional norms and logics that different types of social investors need to manage. Social 
investment logics would be positioned between financial- and societal-maximization. The 
investors are rather driven by the values of their investments, by their means to reach an 
end, or by blending both in a “systemic” rationality (Nicholls, 2010). Moore et al. (2012) also 
highlight that “In social finance, two quite distinct – and historically incompatible – traditions 
of capital allocation have come together in the new hybrid institutions and logics.” We further 
argue that the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN), which is an association acting as a 
professional one, permitted to theorize an institutional change in the sense of Greenwood et 
al. (2002) by structuring the impact investing industry from a predominantly investing 
institution. To that end, the GIIN promotes the definition of impact investments as 
“investments intended to create positive impact beyond financial return” (O’Donohoe et al., 
2010, p. 5), thus building beliefs and a common strategy. The organization also encourages 
the adoption of societal performance monitoring practices through the creation and 
promotion of the IRIS catalog of societal impact metrics (Höchstädter & Scheck, 2014), which 
is part of our institutional logic.  
Theoretical perspectives on responses to pressures 
Earlier understandings of the neo-institutional theory suggested that pressures to enact 
isomorphism and conformity could be overcome by organizations through decoupling (Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977). When decoupling, firms give only ceremonial or symbolical commitment to 
institutional pressures without adopting their required practices. This permits organizations to 
keep their values and beliefs unchanged. More recently, studies attempted to predict the 
responses of organizations facing multiple conflicting logics (Reay & Hinings, 2009). Studies 
focusing on the social innovation field and more specifically on microfinance organizations 
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(Battilana & Dorado, 2010), social enterprises (Tracey et al., 2011), or social integration 
enterprises (Pache & Santos, 2013) highlight a combination or an adoption of both intact 
logics rather than decoupling. According to Battilana and Dorado (2010), having no prior 
experience with a logic would be a prerequisite in an organization for blended hybridization. 
While institutional theory focuses on the external logics being exerted on the organization, 
the influence of these logics are also linked to  the control that its proponents have over the 
resources of the organization (Greenwood et al., 2011). Resource dependence theory (RDT) 
is based on the notion that “all organizations critically depend on other organizations for the 
provision of vital resources, and that this dependence is often reciprocal” (Drees & Heugens, 
2013, p. 1667). Recent writings have also highlighted that conformity might have been 
exaggerated and that factors such as agency, choice, proactiveness and self-interest can 
lead to a variety of responses to institutional pressures (Jamali, 2010; Oliver, 1991; Tan & 
Wang, 2011). In their meta-analysis of 157 articles on RDT, Drees and Heugens (2013) 
validate the theory that was initially formulated by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978): organizations 
respond to resource dependencies from external actors by forming inter-organizational 
arrangements, which in turn strengthen the organizational autonomy as well as its legitimacy. 
Research on hybrid organizations has not devoted much attention to a resource dependence 
perspective and the associated arrangements that such actors could develop. 
Therefore our article aims at addressing impact investing as hybrid organizations evolving 
in an institution in the making through a neo-institutional and a resource dependence theory 
perspective. We further propose to study the responses of such hybrid organizations that 
primarily rely on an investment logic while integrating a development logic to pursue their 
societal purpose. 
2.3. Theoretical framework: Strategic responses to institutional pressures 
Five strategic responses 
Drawing on resource dependence and institutional arguments, Oliver (1991) proposes a 
detailed typology of strategic responses available for organizations facing institutional 
pressures. These include Acquiescence, Compromise, Avoidance, Defiance and 
Manipulation. Figure 1 sorts these strategic responses from passive conformity to proactive 
resistance. 
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Passive  
Conformity 
   Active 
 Resistance 
 
     
 
 
Acquiescence Compromise Avoidance Defiance Manipulation 
 
 Habit Balance Conceal Dismiss Co-opt  
 Imitate Pacify Buffer Challenge Influence  
 Comply Bargain Escape Attack Control  
 
Figure 1. A repertoire of responses to institutional pressures (adapted from Jamali, 2010) 
The most passive response, acquiescence, refers to the adoption of institutional logics 
and values. Such a response will be pursued through the habit of taken-for-granted norms, 
the imitation of institutional models, or the compliance to institutional requirements. 
Compromise refers to a partial conformity with institutional requirements. Organizations will 
balance the multiple expectations through negotiation, pacify some of the institutional 
pressures, or bargain demands from institutional stakeholders. Avoidance refers to the 
attempt by organizations to preclude the necessity of conformity or to circumvent the 
conditions that make this conformity necessary. Organizations will try to conceal their 
nonconformity, buffer themselves from institutional pressures, or simply escape institutional 
rules and expectations. A more active response, Defiance, refers to an explicit rejection of at 
least one of the institutional pressures. Organizations achieve this by dismissing or ignoring 
specific institutional logics, by challenging the rules and requirements, or by explicitly 
attacking or denouncing the institutional values and its promoters. Finally, manipulation 
refers to the most active attempt to change or exert power over the requirements that 
themselves or the institutions express and enforce. Manipulation tactics include co-opting the 
source of the pressures, influencing the definition of the norms through lobbying, or even 
controlling the organizations that are the sources of the pressure. 
Five institutional antecedents  
In order to characterize the institutional contexts and conditions under which organizations 
will embrace or resist institutionalizations, Oliver (1991) outlined five antecedents. These 
predictive dimensions include the Cause, Constituents, Content, Control and Context of the 
institutional pressures. Table 1 illustrates the degree of each of these institutional 
antecedents as a prediction of strategic responses adopted by organizations. 
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Table 1. Institutional antecedents and predicted strategic responses (adapted from Oliver, 1991) 
Predictive Factor Acquiesce Compromise Avoid Defy Manipulate 
Cause 
     
Legitimacy H L L L L 
Efficiency H L L L L 
Constituents 
     
Multiplicity L H H H H 
Dependence H H M L L 
Content 
     
Consistency H M M L L 
Constraint L M H H H 
Control 
     
Coercion H M M L L 
Diffusion H H M L L 
Context 
     
Uncertainty H H H L L 
Inter-connectedness H H M L L 
L = Low, M = Moderate, H = High 
 
Cause of institutional pressures typically answers why they are being exerted. It studies 
the rationale or intended adequacy of the organization with a social legitimacy and an 
economic efficiency. Institutional constituents identify who is exerting the pressures. It 
examines the multiplicity of the actors imposing the pressures as well as the dependency of 
the organization on them. The content captures what these pressures are. It considers the 
consistency of the pressures with the organizational goals and the discretionary constraints 
imposed on the organization. Control clarifies how or by what means pressures are exerted. 
It looks at both the legal enforcement and the voluntary diffusion of norms. Finally, the 
institutional context explains where the pressures occur. It explores the uncertainty and the 
interconnectedness of the environmental context within which institutional pressures are 
exerted. 
Pache and Santos (2010) mobilize Oliver’s typology of strategic responses to study 
institutional pressures that are exerted upon hybrid organizations. However, their study does 
not carefully track the variations in the ten dimensions of Oliver’s antecedents. They argue 
that the predictive power of Oliver’s model is quite low when it comes to specifying 
responses to conflicting institutional logics exerted on the hybrid organization (Pache & 
Santos, 2010). We aim at opening the discussion one stage further, i.e. when a hybrid 
organization such as an impact investing fund faces the pressures from an institution in the 
making. Therefore our paper considers that the co-existing logics they are facing are no 
longer necessarily antagonists. Relying on Greenwood et al. (2011, p. 352), the objective of 
our study is a first step to “learn whether organizations experiencing enduring and stable 
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institutional complexity develop blended hybrid arrangements that, over time, become 
institutionalized within the organization and thus uncontested ‘settlements’.” This is in line 
with Moore et al. (2012) calling for a new research agenda exploring social finance that 
would examine its institutional antecedents and contexts as well as “explore hybridity and 
seek to understand how such blended logics reproduce or challenge existing institutional 
structures” (Moore et al., 2012, p. 127). Our research aims at filling these gaps. 
3. RESEARCH CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY  
3.1. The case of Energy Access Ventures Fund 
Schneider Electric Access to Energy program 
This case focuses on an impact investing fund that emanates from Schneider Electric, a 
leading French multinational enterprise in energy management. The company evolved to 
position itself as a solution provider for utilities and infrastructures, industries and machine 
manufacturers, non-residential buildings, data centers and networks, and the residential 
sector. The company employs more than 150 000 people worldwide, reaching a turnover of 
24 billion Euros in 2013, for which developing economies represented 43%. Inscribed in the 
company’s strategy, the Sustainable Development direction initiated an Access to Energy 
program in 2009 (André & Ponssard, 2015). This “Base of the Pyramid” (BoP) initiative aims 
at promoting access to energy for low-income populations in Africa, India and South-East 
Asia (Vermot Desroches & André, 2012). The Access to Energy program combines three 
business and philanthropic approaches: 
• An impact investing fund, Schneider Electric Energy Access (SEEA), financially 
supports the development of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the field of 
access to energy and job integration; 
• An offer creation team develops a specific portfolio of products and solutions. A 
business development team deploys them to commercially meet the means and 
needs of BoP populations that lack access to modern energy; 
• A training team sponsors the creation of vocational training, through the financial 
support of the company’s Foundation, in order to develop long-term regional 
competencies in electricity trades. 
Since its launch, the Access to Energy program testifies for having invested in twelve 
SMEs; provided energy to more than 2.3 million households; and created almost 40 training 
programs in energy management reaching more than 62,000 people (Schneider Electric, 
2015a). 
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Energy Access Ventures Fund 
In late 2011, Schneider Electric capitalized on its experience with the SEEA fund to initiate 
the creation of a second bigger impact investing fund, called Energy Access Ventures Fund 
(EAVF). EAVF stipulates in its legal document that it has “a unique positioning” in the energy 
sector: “between Traditional pure private equity funds, targeting high investment returns and 
mainly investing in emerging markets; and Venture philanthropists and foundations, 
prioritizing social impact over financial return” (EAVF, 2015, p. 3). It further positions itself as 
a hybrid organization and defines itself as being “an impact private equity fund with a double 
objective: (i) generate a financial return for its investors between 6% and 10% net of 
management fees and (ii) complete investments with a measurable social impact on local 
communities” (EAVF, 2015, p. 3).  
While SEEA cumulated total assets of € 4 million and invested in 12 companies in late 
2014, EAVF succeeded in aggregating a total of € 54.5 million at the date of its closing in 
early 2015 (Schneider Electric, 2015b). Schneider Electric – the sponsor company – invested 
30% of the total assets of EAVF alongside four Development Finance Institutions (DFIs): the 
UK’s CDC Group (30%), the European Investment Bank (EIB – 18%), the French Global 
Environment Facility (FFEM) and PROPARCO (12%), and the OPEC Fund for International 
Development (OFID – 9%). EAVF is composed of three entities: the Energy Access Fund 
that receives the capitalization; its management company Aster Capital Partners, a portfolio 
management company specialized in private equity; and the advisory company Energy 
Access Ventures, in charge of the screening, the due diligence, the monitoring and the exit of 
investments. Figure 2 depicts the organizational structure of EAVF at the date of its closing in 
February 2015. 
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As for the Impact Performance Monitoring system, the fund had to develop its own 
methodology as no explicit tools were available neither in the impact investing industry nor in 
the energy access sector. EAVF developed an IPM system aimed at tracking the changes 
induced by an investment, i.e. focusing on the inputs, activities, and outputs/outcomes – as 
defined by OECD (2002). The IPM tool relies on a matrix of about forty key performance 
indicators gathered in a spreadsheet. Most of the indicators come from the IRIS catalog 
(GIIN, 2015) to ensure standardization and ease of sharing of results with the fund’s 
investors and stakeholders. The tool is then adapted in accordance with EAVF’s co-investors 
for each portfolio company in order to better fit with the specificity of their activities. An 
annual assessment of the investees’ activities reviews their social outcomes related to the 
promotion of access to energy as a basis for development; their economic outcomes in 
developing local economic activities; and their environmental outcomes related to the 
mitigation of the impact of the company on the environment. 
The requirement to adopt a societal management procedure implies that the EAVF team 
must dedicate a significant amount of time to assessing, reviewing, and reporting the societal 
performance of its investments. Meanwhile, the EAVF team raised some operational 
limitation concerns based on their previous experience in impact investing. All those aspects 
were negotiated with their investors prior to the final closing of the fund. 
3.2. Action Research and case study methodology 
The research question of how an impact investing fund can respond to the pressure to 
conform to societal performance management originates from a doctoral collaboration with 
Schneider Electric. In September 2011, the author initiated an applied research with the 
Sustainable Development direction, which focused on the company’s concern about 
managing extra-financial benefits of its “Base of the Pyramid” program. At that time, the 
Access to Energy program was already running the SEEA fund. A few months later the 
company took the decision to build a second external impact investing fund that would 
become EAVF. The research collaboration permitted to the author to share his time with the 
team and thus develop an “insider” position (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007). In that sense, I 
benefited from an “active member” status and assumed “a functional role in addition to the 
observational role” (Adler & Adler, 1987). My position facilitated building “trust and 
acceptance of the researcher” (Adler & Adler, 1987) and gave me the ability to get into the 
organizational system, to take part in the meetings, and to influence decisions related to the 
research partnership. A governance mechanism aimed at avoiding a potential interpretation 
bias related to the insider position of the researcher, who is said to have an underlying social, 
economic, or even ideological motivation. Twice a year, a steering committee of the research 
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The cyclical process of the action-research started with the understanding of the need for 
a new impact investing fund to integrate a societal management procedure within its 
investment procedure. This preliminary question rose with the anticipated requirements from 
Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) that could become the co-investors of the fund 
alongside Schneider Electric. A review of the stakes for an impact investing fund to manage 
its societal value creation highlighted the requirement to adopt an ESG management system 
and to develop a specific Impact Performance Monitoring (IPM) system related to the mission 
and the sector of the fund. The IPM tool would permit the investment managers to estimate 
ex-ante the societal benefits of a potential investee, to track the fund’s societal performance 
from its actual investment until the exit and to report to their own investors and community at 
large. Once the IPM tool had been designed, a first experimentation was conducted with one 
of the portfolio companies of the first fund, active in Uganda. Based on the theoretical 
methodology and the learning of the experimentation, the fund managers presented the 
overall procedure to its potential investors. Negotiations started from this point in order to 
take into account the requirements of the funds’ potential investors while remaining 
operationally pragmatic for the future managers of EAVF and for its investees. 
The remaining of the paper is built on an in-depth case study methodology (Eisenhardt  & 
Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009) that focuses on the perceived antecedents from EAVF on the 
strategic responses to the institutional pressures to conform to societal performance 
management. The case study is exploratory (Yin, 2009). Hypotheses and data were either 
directly obtained or created through exchanges with the client system (Susman & Evered, 
1978). Throughout the different phases of action-research, methods of data collection 
included the study of internal documents, the production of research notes and 
presentations, and the development of EAVF procedures. An important time was dedicated 
to informal exchanges with members of both the Sustainable Development direction and the 
EAVF future team and for which minutes were written down in a research logbook. The 
methodology also relies on participatory and deliberative meetings gathering members of 
both the internal and external client system. Each meeting’s purpose was structured and 
submitted ex-ante to participants and the discussions were synthesized and collegially 
shared ex-post. These notes aimed at generating knowledge with the client system, 
especially during the negotiation phase. Finally, five semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with managers or directors related to EAVF, which allowed for the completion of 
the analysis based on Oliver’s framework. The semi-structured questionnaire is depicted in 
Appendix 1. A literal transcription of the recorded interviews permitted a consistent use of the 
data.  
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4. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The following part describes the managerial perceptions of institutional antecedents of 
adopting a Societal Management Procedure. All participants of this research adhered to a 
combination of adopting an existing ESG management system from the CDC group and 
developing a specific Impact Performance Monitoring system mainly based on the IRIS 
catalog of indicators. Table 2 summarizes the characterization of each of the five 
antecedents and their predictive factors.  
Table 2. EAVF Managerial perceptions (in bold italics) of institutional antecedents of SMP 
Predictive Factor Acquiesce Compromise Avoid Defy Manipulate 
Cause 
     
Legitimacy H L L L L 
Efficiency H L L L L 
Constituents 
     
Multiplicity L H H H H 
Dependence H H M L L 
Content 
     
Consistency H M M L L 
Constraint L M H H H 
Control 
     
Coercion H M M L L 
Diffusion H H M L L 
Context 
     
Uncertainty H H H L L 
Inter-connectedness H H M L L 
L = Low, M = Moderate, H = High 
4.1. Perceptions of cause: legitimacy and efficiency 
The participation of EAVF in a Societal Management Procedure seems mostly driven by 
salient legitimacy. Directly linked with its inner societal mission, a respondent stipulates that 
“The fund has been created to get an impact” and that it is “clearly for this reason that DFIs 
came as co-investors”. Tracking, reporting and improving its societal impact aim at validating 
the fund’s societal objective and at promoting its credibility. In the words of one of the 
managers interviewed, “alignment with this procedure first helps us to make sure that our 
investees have a positive impact. Then we can report to our own investors that are quite 
cautious about the developmental role of their assets.” Another participant stipulates that 
“this procedure will help us to objectify our capacity to deliver societal returns.” Reputation, 
status, or image has not been stated as a primary concern for EAVF managers. However it is 
noteworthy that at the origin of this project, Schneider Electric – the sponsor of the fund – 
inscribed EAVF in the continuity of its CSR strategy and its existing Access to Energy 
program. In that sense, an investment manager recognized that “this impact investing fund 
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has been identified by Schneider as an innovative tool to contribute to the development of 
populations and to position itself as a leading actor in the energy access space”. 
The majority of the interviewees questioned the explicit contribution of the SMP to 
economic gains or economic rationalization. While they have no track record yet to testify for 
such economic benefits for the investees – and therefore the fund – we might notice two 
possibilities. On the one hand, societal management systems might imply serious costs and 
time for a portfolio company in the short term. One manager stipulates that “These are 
complex procedures that could affect negatively the profitability of the ventures.” On the other 
hand, portfolio companies could benefit from the SMP reports in the midterm, provided that 
they testify for a positive societal value creation. In that sense, one of the participants 
highlights that “access to specific developmental funding, grants or preferred loans will 
inherently contribute to the financial strength of the portfolio companies”. Similarly, managing 
and mitigating ESG risks is acknowledged by most of the interviewees to increase the 
economic stability of the ventures in the long-term.  
It is thus fair to characterize the perceptions of these institutional antecedents as high in 
relation to legitimacy and low in relation to efficiency as illustrated in Table 2. 
4.2. Perceptions of constituents: multiplicity and dependence 
The actors demanding for the fund to adopt a Societal Management Procedure remain 
relatively limited to the Development Finance Institutions that invested in it. One of the 
investment managers stipulates, “At the beginning there was a common aspiration between 
the DFIs to focus on social impact criteria rather than on the financial return.” While there is 
no standard for ESG management systems, one of the DFIs suggested using its own toolkit, 
which diminished the multiplicity of demands from the others. In regards to the Impact 
Performance Monitoring, the proposal to use the emerging standardized indicators from the 
IRIS catalog has been well received by the fund’s investors. However, most of the 
interviewees insisted on highly diversified requirements from one DFI to another. Such a 
multiplicity on the degrees of expectations presented some conflicting expectations in some 
of the domains of impacts that had to be measured. One of the participants states that “Every 
DFI has its own societal impact measures and indicators.” He explains further that “There 
has been a huge work to harmonize each of their requirements and at the end, the reporting 
is quite heavy.” 
It is clear that EAVF dependency to adopt a Societal Management Procedure is 
fundamental. The creation of a SMP that would meet the requirements of the DFIs appears 
to be a prerequisite to get their approval to invest in the fund. While there were no alternative 
solutions to complying with the DFIs requirements, this does not mean that EAVF team 
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members did not discussed the SMP. However, one manager admits, "we were in a process 
in which our capacity to negotiate was limited by our own willingness to close this fund.” 
Another participant states further, “Time will tell us if we solely must comply with the 
demands of the DFIs or if we can resist”. Nonetheless, the use of a sufficiently robust ESG 
management tool and standardized IRIS indicators is acknowledged by EAVF members as 
being an advantage in terms of legitimacy for future external certification and rating. 
Accordingly, the respective perceptions of these institutional antecedents are 
characterized as low in relation to multiplicity and high in relation to dependence as depicted 
in Table 2. 
4.3. Perceptions of content: consistency and constraints 
All the interviewees considered a Societal Management Procedure to be very consistent 
with the fund’s impact mission. Most of them posited that conformity to this demand was a 
natural extension given their social aspirations. The SMP is fully integrated in every step of 
the investment procedure, from the initial screening to the exit strategy through the due-
diligence phase and the post-investment monitoring. Moreover, the participants acknowledge 
the consistency of a great majority of the IPM tool indicators with the business activity of their 
future investees. However, fund’s managers considered that some of the requirements of the 
DFIs lead to a too encumbering procedure. As a consequence, they feared that complex 
requirements imposed to investees could become counter-productive and potentially hinder 
their business development activities. One manager characterized it in these terms, “We 
don’t want a venture to be drowning in demands it might consider absurd. As an example, 
asking a company to track the incomes of each of its customers might be typically difficult or 
even inappropriate.” This is also why the SMP focuses on impact performance indicators up 
to the outcomes that can be directly measured by the investees rather than evaluating the 
long-term social impacts per se.  
Negotiations took place when EAVF team and its investors had to agree on the final 
Societal Performance Procedure to adopt. The relatively standard ESG management system 
that was chosen appeared to be easily incorporated in the fund’s activities. On the contrary, 
the Impact Monitoring Performance system had to be created and then was the focus of 
most of the discussions. The fund managers agreed with their investors on a compulsory list 
of key performance indicators that would be assessed periodically for every portfolio 
company. However, more complex reporting requirements specific to each DFIs remained at 
the discretion of the fund managers on a bilateral reporting basis. EAVF team also managed 
to leave the financial and operational responsibility of thorough social impact evaluations to 
the DFIs, should they be willing to get more accurate long-term studies. As an illustration, 
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one of the interviewee states: “We are impact investors. We invest in business ventures 
whose job is not to conduct extensive sociological surveys on each of their customers”. 
Another participant explains that “the fund will not be accountable for social impact 
evaluations. The fund will rather provide an analysis field for the DFIs”. 
Based on patterns of responses obtained, it is thus possible to characterize the 
perceptions of these institutional antecedents as moderate in relation to both consistency 
and constraints as illustrated in Table 2. 
4.4. Perceptions of control: coercion and diffusion 
The compliance to the Societal Management Procedure, agreed during negotiations, is 
legally enforced through the contract signed between EAVF and its investors. EAVF team 
intends to apply and be accountable towards the DFIs for the overall application of the SMP 
within its day to day investment procedure. In the short to mid-term, the fund has an 
obligation of means in executing the SMP. It involves reporting on the activities of the 
investees and the fund respectively on a quarterly and an annual basis. In the long-term, the 
fund also has an obligation of outcomes, related to its both objectives of financial and 
societal returns. Not respecting those two obligations might become a reason for the DFIs to 
stop their periodic disbursements in EAVF when they would require additional assets to 
invest in new companies. One of the fund’s managers compares the SMP as a “governance 
tool with all the means of pressures that goes with it, including potential sanctions for 
instance on our variable compensation.”  
While the diversity of methodologies in both ESG and IPM remains relatively low, no 
regulations require impact investing funds to adopt specific practices. Nonetheless, ESG 
systems are acknowledged to be diffused in the similar Socially Responsible Investment 
industry and tend to be applied in the impact investing one. Similarly, the IRIS catalog of 
indicators serves as a potential standard. One of the participants highlighted that the 
“diffusion of standards remain relatively low, especially in the access to energy sector.” 
Dwelling further on the implementation of the SMP, he explains: “we will have to demonstrate 
its acceptability, we will have to diffuse our practices and by this way we will set a precedent 
which will serve as a reference in our industry.” It is also in that sense that the investment 
managers intend to certify their application of the Principles for Responsible Investments 
(PRI) on the ESG side of the SMP, or to be rated through the Global Impact Investing Rating 
Systems (GIIRS) on the IPM side of the SMP. 
Therefore, we might characterize the perceptions of these institutional antecedents 
respectively as high in relation to coercion and as moderate in relation to diffusion as 
depicted in Table 2. 
Institutionalization of Impact Investing 
 24/34  
4.5. Perceptions of context: uncertainty and interconnectedness 
The emerging procedures and standard indicators for both the ESG and IPM systems are 
acknowledged by the fund’s managers as being relatively stable. Most of the concerns about 
the uncertainty of their Societal Management Procedure were on the IRIS catalog of 
indicators promoted by the GIIN. At the time of the final adoption of specific indicators within 
the IPM system, the IRIS catalog was in its third version. Most of the chosen indicators were 
slightly modified compared to previous versions of IRIS. One manager states that “the 
methodology today is not a standard but if it has to evolve it will never be a reconfiguration of 
our way of thinking.”  
Inter-connectedness is a salient aspect for the context of the overall Societal Management 
Procedure of the fund. First, EAVF will always co-invest with other impact investors as 
defined by its investment rules. This will require aligning its societal management procedure 
with other funds that are also seeking to mitigate ESG risks and improve the societal 
performance of their investments. Second, EAVF team will have periodic exchange on the 
SMP with its investors, and specifically the DFIs. Third, the participants acknowledge that the 
impact investing industry is still a relatively small community of diverse actors that gather 
around the GIIN consortium. An investment manager highlights that the adoption of a 
relatively stringent and demanding procedure constitutes an advantage for anticipating its 
next evolutions. He further explains, “We will have the capacity to participate in the 
discussions and influence what will become a norm thanks to our deep experience in the 
energy access sector but also thanks to the legitimacy that we’ll get from complying to the 
high levels of requirements from the DFIs.” 
Accordingly, the respective perceptions of these institutional antecedents are 
characterized as low in relation to uncertainty and high in relation to interconnectedness as 
illustrated in Table 2. 
5. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The research findings of the article attempted to gauge managerial perceptions from 
EAVF team members to conform to a Societal Management Procedure as depicted in Table 
2. Admitting that the qualitative answers to characterize each antecedent might be 
subjective, it was nevertheless possible to detect rather low or high ranges based on the 
patterns of answers derived by the participants as well as on their precise rating of each 
dimension considered as low, moderate or high as illustrated in Appendix 1.  
In terms of perception of Cause, the fund was pressured to conform to an SMP mainly 
regarding salient legitimacy purposes. The fund managers mentioned their personal values 
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as well as their belief that impact investing in energy access ventures can bring long term 
positive societal impacts. They also considered that the procedure could hinder the short-
term profitability of the investees but acknowledged its long term benefits in terms of 
economic survival. In relation to perceptions of Constituents, the pressure to conform to an 
SMP was asked by a relatively low number of actors, namely the four potential investors. The 
fund’s managers had to comply with the DFIs requirements in order to get their approval to 
invest in EAVF, thus highlighting a high degree of dependency. In terms of perceptions of 
Content, the fund was pressured to conform to DFIs requirements that were relatively 
consistent with its internal practices. The diverse requirements were homogenized and 
integrated into the fund’s overall investment procedure but revealed some constraints. EAVF 
managers negotiated for instance that long-term social impact evaluations would be borne by 
the DFIs in order to remain solely accountable towards societal performance. Pertaining to 
perceptions of Control, the pressures to conform to an SMP were exerted through a legal 
contract, binding EAVF with its investors. The DFIs could stop their periodic investments if 
EAVF does not comply with an obligation of means and outcomes. The managers 
considered that anticipating the potential status of standard for the SMP’s components would 
therefore facilitate the fund to get externally certified or rated in the near future. Finally 
moving onto perceptions of Context, EAVF managers considered the environmental context 
as quite favorable. Even if the changes in the methodologies that they mobilized in the SMP 
are not entirely predictable, they remain confident with the relatively high level of 
requirements they chose to adopt since the beginning. The interconnectedness of the fund 
within a relatively small community of impact investors will permit EAVF to participate and 
influence the next evolutions in the industry’s institutional logics. 
Our findings validate the theoretical framework of Oliver (1991) by challenging the central 
assumption of institutional theory that predicts passive conformity. They complete the 
empirical work of Jamali (2010) by identifying empirical conditions under which institutional 
pressures fail in their predicted effects. In our case study, EAVF did not enact isomorphism 
per se as no explicit standards were either shared within the impact investing industry or 
agreed between the fund’s investors, namely the Development Finance Institutions. The 
findings rather suggest that acquiescence appeared first to EAVF as a natural strategic 
response under institutional antecedents of low multiplicity and high legitimacy, dependence, 
coercion, and interconnectedness. EAVF managers initially adopted a societal management 
procedure as a mean to conform to their own beliefs and values, their investors’ expectations 
and the emerging practices of the impact investing industry. In a second phase, EAVF 
searched for compromise as a strategic response to the DFIs pressures when facing 
institutional antecedents of rather low efficiency, moderate consistency and constraints and 
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high dependence and interconnectedness. The requirements of the DFIs to enrich the fund’s 
Societal Management Procedure led to inter-organizational arrangements and negotiations. 
EAVF managers acknowledged their resource dependence towards the DFIs that somehow 
limited their bargaining power. The fund’s managers discussed the relative complexity of the 
procedure that could hinder the business development activities of the portfolio companies. 
However, they recognize that such procedure could grant them legitimacy towards external 
rating and certifying bodies. Yet the findings also suggest that symbolic conformity can blend 
in practice with different aspects of resistance – i.e. avoidance, defiance or manipulation – 
under institutional conditions of low efficiency and uncertainty, and moderate consistency 
and diffusion.  
Beyond solely compliance or isomorphism to societal management pressures, the 
research findings reveal a potential risk for EAVF managers to avoid the DFIs requirements 
once they will pragmatically face the operational constraints of investing in social enterprises. 
This could lead EAVF to adopt a symbolic conformity, or in other words to enact decoupling 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977), by giving only ceremonial or symbolic commitment to its societal 
performance monitoring and reporting requirements. As one of the managers stipulates, 
“Managing societal performance of the fund would correspond to a full time position that we 
cannot afford today. Even if we’ll get support from partners and investors, at the end we will 
have to do it on our own. I think that the reality of the field will impose us some shortcuts 
compared to an ideal implementation of the SMP.” The risk in such decoupling would be to 
impregnate the fund with a “social identity” in response to institutional pressures from its 
investors and its stakeholders at large. This would be comparable to a “green washing” 
attempt as pinpointed by Hamilton and Gioia (2009). MacLean and Behnam (2010) highlight 
the danger of creating a “legitimacy façade” that enables the institutionalization of 
misconduct and precipitates a loss of external legitimacy. The findings suggest that the inter-
organizational arrangements related to the resource dependency of the fund will, however, 
continue during its life-time. EAVF managers consider that their tradeoff between legitimacy 
and autonomy will be facilitated thanks to periodic discussions and renegotiations of the 
DFIs’ requirements. 
The research findings also discuss the observation of incompatible institutional demands 
in social enterprises and hybrid organizations (Pache & Santos, 2010, 2013). We might 
indeed highlight a conflict – or a delicate balance – between profit and societal value creation 
objectives for the investment managers. Similar to the fund’s hybrid logic, portfolio 
companies have to maintain both a societal mission and financial profitability. The Societal 
Management Procedure integrated within the overall investment procedure of the fund 
consists in a novel form of practices meant to handle such tensions. One manager explains, 
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“We will have to dedicate significant amounts of time and money to ventures that do not 
financially outperform, while keeping in mind their capacity to deliver societal impacts. But 
these resources will never be as high as the ones we will have to dedicate to ventures that 
ensure the fund to reach its financial objective. Generally speaking, the profits you made on 
one side can compensate the losses on the other.” In that sense, we could characterize 
EAVF managers as finance-first investors (Freireich & Fulton, 2009). Nonetheless, the fund’s 
managers recognize that they embed two logics that are potentially conflicting although not 
incompatible. As an illustration, one of the fund’s managers explains, “honestly today as 
being an impact investor, I am considered as a capitalist when I am discussing with NGOs 
and as an activist when I am discussing with venture capitalists. But we are a new category 
of players that are capitalists-activists, or the opposite, it’s doesn’t matter. In fact, those are 
not contradictory opposites.” These findings reveal the actual development of “blended 
hybrid arrangements” (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 352) within EAVF that can indeed face 
conflicting logics but not incompatible ones (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 
2009).  
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Traditional prejudices against case study methods rely on the limited ability to generalize 
the findings (Yin, 2009, pp. 14-16). We acknowledge that the findings are tied to the impact 
investing fund we studied. A single case study method however allows the researcher to 
explore a phenomenon in-depth (Voss, Tsikriktsis, & Frohlich, 2002). Prior theoretical work 
and empirical observations are lacking for the nascent impact investing industry (Höchstädter 
& Scheck, 2014; Nicholls, 2010). The paper builds onto a case study methodology and 
mobilizes strong primary empirical data through action-research, which is particularly well-
suited to such new research areas (Eisenhardt  & Graebner, 2007). The paper further aims 
at considering impact investing as a research stream within the social innovation field by 
relying on the established neo-institutional and resource dependence theories. As initiated by 
Oliver (1991), the emerging combination of both literatures has been stated as useful in 
studying the responses of an organization to competing logics (Greenwood et al., 2011). 
We wanted to understand how an impact investing fund in its creation phase could 
respond to societal management pressure. Our findings reveal that the strategic response of 
the fund consisted initially of acquiesce to institutional pressures (i.e. passive conformity) and 
turned into searching for a compromise with its investors, namely the Development Finance 
Institutions. Therefore, our paper reasserts theoretical and empirical evidence for a 
multiplicity of resistive answers to institutional pressures beyond solely passive conformity 
(Jamali, 2010; Oliver, 1991). The paper also appears to be a first contribution in studying the 
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possibility of cycles of responses in a hybrid organization. As highlighted by Greenwood et al. 
(2011, p. 351), “The sustainability of organizational responses and their alteration and 
variability across time is a neglected but important theme that deserves serious attention.” As 
such, we call for further researching the potential feedback effects of future organizational 
responses on the institution itself once EAVF and other impact investing funds will have 
sufficient operational track records. A first step would be to look at the way impact investing 
funds have appropriated in time their societal management procedures and whether they 
have contributed to the evolution of their institutional logics by communicating or interacting 
with their own investors, co-investors, and stakeholders at large. 
Our findings also address the status of a hybrid organization – within the social innovation 
field – that faces two dominant and co-existing institutional logics, namely an investment 
logic and a development logic. Our findings reassert that the development of internal 
processes within the organization, taking the form in our case of a fully integrated societal 
management procedure, facilitates the balance between potentially conflicting logics that are 
no longer considered incompatible (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2009). These 
findings further assert the establishment of impact investing as an institution in the making. 
The nascent impact investing industry benefitted from the work of a proto-institution 
(Lawrence et al., 2002) such as the Global Impact Investing Network that promoted its 
values, beliefs and emerging practices and norms (Höchstädter & Scheck, 2014). Impact 
investing is therefore suggested to transition towards a fully institutionalized status provided 
that its practices are sufficiently diffused in the interconnected community of its practitioners.  
An important question remains on the capacity of these impact investing funds and their 
portfolio companies to reach both positive financial and societal performance and to survive 
in time. Both resource dependence and institutional theories predict that respectively inter-
organizational arrangements and isomorphism lead to legitimacy and autonomy (Drees & 
Heugens, 2013; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991). However there is missing evidence on 
the causality between legitimacy and organizational performance. While Drees and Heugens 
(2013) found no support for a mediating role for legitimacy towards organizational 
performance, other studies argued for such a link in other contexts (Baum & Oliver, 1991; 
Deephouse, 1999). Economics works could further study the complementarities between the 
various components of societal responsibility and financial performance (Cavaco & Crifo, 
2014). This would further enrich and discuss the findings of the first study performed by 
Evans (2013) on sixteen impact investors, which suggest that contracting strategies enable a 
strong financial performance without sacrificing impact. 
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Appendix 1 
Questionnaire on institutional antecedents 
Introduction:  
We argue that impact investing is evolving in two types of “institutions”: an investing and a developmental institution, which both entail pressures to adopt 
specific values, beliefs, norms, rules and practices. 
 
Our research question is to examine “how an impact investing fund is responding to institutional pressures and more specifically to conform to a 
Societal Management Procedure (SMP)”. By SMP we refer to both the ESG management system and the Impact Performance Monitoring system. 
 
To answer this question we will scrutinize the “antecedents” of the pressure related to societal performance monitoring. Oliver’s (1991) framework describes 
5 antecedents: cause, constituents, content, control and context. 
 
You will be asked you to discuss / dwell on 10 of the antecedents’ dimensions and to characterize them as being low, moderate or high. 
 
Questionnaire: 
 
1. Cause 
“Cause” antecedent answers why the fund is being pressured to conform to societal management procedure rules or expectations. 
 
• Legitimacy         Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
 
Implication of adherence to SMP for the fund's legitimacy, status, or image and prestige? for reputation and risk management in the short and long-term? 
 
 
• Efficiency          Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
 
Implication of adherence to SMP for the bottom line in the short and long-term? for economic gains, economic rationalizations, technical goals/standards, 
and/or efficiency in the broadest sense? 
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2. Constituents 
“Constituents” antecedent characterize who is exerting the pressure on the fund. 
 
• Multiplicity         Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
 
Implication of adherence to SMP in terms of patterns of demands or expectation vis-à-vis your fund (i.e. clear expectations/prescriptions, coherent norms, 
compatible demands)? 
Implication of adherence to SMP for patterns of interactions with different national or international actors (please provide example)? 
 
 
• Dependence         Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
 
Implication of adherence to SMP for your dependence on various external actors/organizations (e.g. certifying bodies, regulatory agencies, multilateral 
organizations)? 
The discretion or ability afforded to comply with or resist the demand associated with SMP as well as the availability of other alternative standards? 
 
 
3. Content 
“Content” antecedent explains to what norms or requirements the fund is being pressured to conform. 
 
• Consistency         Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
 
The degree of fit between requirements/stipulations of SMP and internal fund vision/goals/interests/and aspirations? 
The extent to which the expectations of SMP are compatible with internal logic of operations, technical and economic standards, stewardship 
goals/aspirations? 
 
 
 
• Constraint         Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
 
Implications of SMP for discretion, latitude and autonomy in decision making in relation to fund-environment relations? 
The extent to which your fund has retained control in determining its decisions in key areas addressed by SMP? 
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4. Control 
“Control” antecedent clarifies how or by what means the pressures are being exerted. 
 
• Coercion         Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
 
The extent to which SMP is considered to be equivalent to the force of law? 
The extent to which compliance with SMP is considered to be highly punitive and strictly enforced? 
The extent to which compliance with SMP is scrutinized by regulatory agencies? 
 
 
• Diffusion         Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
 
The extent to which the norms and expectations of SMP are considered highly diffused, supported, and accepted? 
The extent to which the social validity of SMP is by now largely unquestioned, and it has acquired a rule like status in social thought and action? 
Views of the number and characteristics of other funds that have adopted SMP, and the extent to which "the contagion of legitimacy" is salient? 
 
 
5. Context 
“Context” antecedent explains what is the environmental context within which societal performance monitoring pressures are being exerted. 
 
• Uncertainty         Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
 
The extent to which the organizational field of SMP is considered highly uncertain, and changes in the field to be rapid and not entirely predictable? 
The extent to which there is a perceived need for increased security, stability, and predictability in relation to SMP diffusion patterns and institutionalization? 
 
 
 
• Interconnectedness        Please characterize this dimension as Low, Moderate, High 
 
The extent to which funds adhering to SMP feel inter-connected by values, norms, shared information, relational channels, and coordination mechanisms? 
The extent to which adherence to SMP requires coordination and negotiation, regular exchange, and inter-organizational linkages? 
 
